War and Racism are NOT the Answer . . . Our most heartfelt sympathies and condolences to all those who lost loved ones on September 11 . . . The Bush administration is attempting to take advantage of this crisis to militarize U.S. society . . . If you believe in civil liberties and oppose racism and war, then join the [ Little empirical research has examined the dissolution of social movement coalitions and the processes that influence organizational decisions to abandon a coalition strategy. This study analyzes the demise of the Mobilization for Global Justice (MGJC) following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The 9/11 terrorist attacks threw into turmoil the MGJC and its then ongoing plans to mobilize mass protests in Washington, DC at the end of September that year. The crisis caused by the attacks forced each social movement organization (SMO) comprising the MGJC to rethink its participation in the coalition. Some abandoned the coalition and their own protest plans almost immediately, while others defected from the coalition but continued to protest. Many delayed their withdrawal from the MGJC out of concern that its collapse would damage the broader global justice movement (GJM). In the end, the MGJC was formally disbanded on the evening of September 15 and the coalition withdrew its endorsement from all post-attack protest events. How and why these decisions were made is the focus of this research, which relies on years of participant observations in organizations central to the GJM, participation in MGJC pre-and post-9/11 organizing meetings, analysis of pre-and post-9/11 organizing e-lists, Web sites, and event fliers, and post-9/11 interviews with key MGJC leaders.
The crisis situation thrust upon the MGJC demanded quick and decisive action with potentially dire consequences if mishandled. Organizational crises are unpredictable events of varying intensity that accelerate the pace of leadership decisions and threaten to harm the organization and its stakeholders (Massey 2001) . Though unpredictable, organizational crises are not unexpected (Coombs 2007) . In fact, SMOs must frequently respond to organizational crises precipitated by critical events that call current strategy into question by "alter [ing] expectations and perceptions of threats, focusing or distracting the attention of movement constituents and other important actors on or away from movement issues" (Staggenborg 1993:320) . Critical events may change the trajectory of social movements and lead to shifts in coalition alliances and strategy. They range from adverse public policy or electoral outcomes, to natural or technological disasters, to large-scale socioeconomic or political events like riots, coups, wars, or terrorist attacks as in the case here (Staggenborg 1993) .
Though the 9/11 attacks were unprecedented in the U.S. experience since Pearl Harbor, the organizational crisis caused for the MGJC differed from SMO crises following other critical events in degree, but not in kind. Thus, an analysis of coalition decision making during this crisis can inform understandings of how SMOs respond to crises associated with more frequent and less extreme critical events (McPhail 1991) . Moreover, crises are increasingly normal experiences for organizations and crisis management to mitigate their damage is increasingly routine for organizations of all kinds including SMOs (Coombs 2007; Massey 2001; Perrow 1999) . Consistent with this, our analysis shows that leaders in the MGJC sought to insulate their organizations from harm and protect their capacity for effective action in the post-attack environment. Some even capitalized on the situation to strengthen their group's position.
Previous scholarship makes clear that SMO decisions to participate in coalitions are influenced by external conditions that affect the mix of perceived costs and benefits coalition partners can expect from cooperation (McCammon and Campbell 2002; Staggenborg 1986; Van Dyke 2003) . However, as circumstances change, each coalition member assesses the possible impacts of those changes on their own needs and priorities (Meyer 2004) . Moreover, SMOs already participating in a coalition will engage in similar cost-benefit analyses when deciding whether to continue or withdraw as circumstances change (Zald and McCarthy 1987) .
Prior research on social movement coalitions has focused almost exclusively on their formation with only a few empirical analyses examining their dissolution. Movement theorists hypothesize that as circumstances change SMOs already participating in a coalition would engage in a cost-benefit analysis to assess the potential impacts of those changes on their own needs and priorities when deciding whether or not to withdraw from a coalition (Meyer 2004; Zald and McCarthy 1987 ). Yet, the literature has not examined empirically how such assessments are made, why coalition leaders decide to abandon a coalition strategy, or what social processes influence those decisions (Minkoff and McCarthy 2005) . Addressing these gaps in the literature is the primary focus of the research here. As shown below, we find that coalition decision makers relied on an informal process to assess how their post-attack decisions would likely affect perceptions of their organization's legitimacy among its key supporters and allies. Management of three facets of organizational legitimacy-pragmatic, moral, and cognitivewas of utmost importance for all organizations involved within the coalition as they sought to preserve exchange relations and affiliated resource flows. In addition, they often followed the lead of organizations most like themselves or groups they wished to continue working with in making the decision to abandon their coalition strategy. We argue that the management of legitimacy is a useful analytic tool for understanding how SMO leaders assess the costs and benefits of potential actions and seek to preserve exchange relationships through changing circumstances of all kinds, including the extreme circumstances examined here.
Background
For nearly two years since protesters successfully shut down the World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings in Seattle in November 1999, the GJM surged in the United States and abroad (della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Gillham and Marx 2000; Smith 2001; Wood 2004) . By the spring of 2001, the movement in the United States had grown well beyond its initial base, attracting active and public participation of prominent labor, women's, and environmental organizations. The U.S. movement's core organizations formed the MGJC to organize Global Justice Week (GJW), a week of demonstrations to coincide with upcoming World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) meetings in Washington, DC. Relying upon the same organizing template used by global justice activists during other protests, throughout the summer of 2001 organizers painstakingly negotiated the terms of involvement in the coalition and the schedule of protest events that would occur under the name of the MGJC (Danaher 2001; Gillham and Edwards 2003; Levi and Murphy 2006; Njehu and Ambrose 2001a) .
The MGJC organized a variety of legal and illegal protest events. Well-known national advocacy organizations had obtained permits from authorities for various rallies and marches to be held on the National Mall. In another legally permitted event, anti-imperialist groups intended to encircle the White House before marching past the World Bank and IMF headquarters. Progressive global justice and anarchist groups planned illegal direct actions to disrupt the World Bank and IMF meetings and faith-based groups prepared public prayer services and vigils. In all, 117 SMOs were tied into the MGJC and were actively planning over two dozen protest events on the eve of the 9/11 attacks (Gillham and Edwards 2003) .
On the morning of September 11, 2001, prominent MGJC organizations had scheduled a press conference to publicly articulate core demands and announce finalized protest plans. Key speakers were to include the presidents of notable organizations like the AFL-CIO, Friends of the Earth, the Feminist Majority as well as leaders of lesser known groups like Essential Action, Jubilee USA, and 50 Years is Enough (AFL-CIO 2001a) . 3 The press conference, scheduled for 11:00 a.m., never happened and neither did most of the meticulously planned protest events. The terrorist attacks precipitated a lightening-stroke transformation of the social and political context and within hours the MGJC began to unravel.
Theoretical Framework

Social Movement Coalition Formation and Dissolution
Social movements are not static entities with fixed boundaries and clearly defined memberships. Rather, they are broad "systems of alliance" (Klandermans 1990 ) whose composition and structure fluctuate as organizations and individuals negotiate often short-term cooperation on common goals (Meyer and Corrigall-Brown 2005; Staggenborg 1986 ). The prominence of coalitions within social movements has long been recognized as both an organizational form and as a tool for coordinating activities among organizations and individuals who may have relatively little in common beyond a particular grievance at a specific point in time (Clemens 1993; Diani and Bison 2004; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Meyer and Rochon 1997; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010; Zald and Ash 1966; Zald and McCarthy 1987) .
The formation of coalitions and SMO decisions to participate in them are influenced by external conditions that affect the mix of perceived costs and benefits coalition partners can expect from cooperation. 4 In forming a coalition, organizations must successfully negotiate an array of actual or potential conflicts to reach an arrangement participants deem appropriate for the given situation. Navigating such interrelated, yet potentially contradictory demands is substantially more difficult in large, diverse coalitions than in smaller and more homophilous ones (Carmin and Bast 2009) . This is, in part, because public affiliation with a diverse group of coalition partners has the potential to undermine an SMO's legitimacy. Managing the perceptions of key actors both internal and external to the organization is an important concern to leaders as they decide whether or not their group will participate in or abandon a coalition. In addition, as circumstances change, each coalition partner assesses the likely impacts of those changes on its own needs and priorities in deciding whether to continue in a coalition or withdraw (Heaney and Rojas 2008, 2011; Meyer 2004; Zald and McCarthy 1987) .
Prior research on social movement coalitions has focused almost entirely on their formation with relatively few studies specifically examining their dissolution (Staggenborg 2010) . This neglect stems partly from the view that because coalitions are temporary organizational vehicles through which member groups pursue specific goals, they would as a matter of course dissolve upon the accomplishment of the purposes for which they were formed. Yet, coalitions often disband prior to accomplishing their goals and little research on social movement coalitions has specifically examined such premature dissolution.
The relatively few studies on coalition dissolution have explored why social movement coalitions unravel, the timing of premature coalition demobilization, and the impact of dissolution on activist networks. Coalitions have come apart because of ideological conflicts over goals and tactics (Staggenborg 1986) , framing disputes (Benford 1993) , and the absence of internal structures available to handle conflict among partners (Levi and Murphy 2006) . The timing of their dissolution has been influenced by changes in political opportunity (Meyer 1993; Meyer and Corrigall-Brown 2005; Tarrow 2005) , increased police repression (Krinsky and Reese 2006; Tarrow 2005) , resource competition (Krinsky and Reese 2006; Staggenborg 1986; Zald and McCarthy 1987) , and increased resource access enabling a member to proceed independently (Jones et al. 2001) . A recent exploration of the consequences of coalition failure for activist networks indicates that the social ties of groups believed responsible for the coalition's break up weaken, while groups not associated with the demise benefit by becoming more central in underlying activist social networks (Heaney and Rojas 2008) .
That SMOs leave coalitions because doing so protects their organizational interests is a consistent theme in these studies, which also tend to explain coalition dissolution as the inverse of formation (Staggenborg 2010) . Hence, if coalition formation requires agreement over issue framing, the presence of trust and credible commitment between partners, structures for managing internal conflict, and selective incentives for all involved (Levi and Murphy 2006) , then analysts seem to presume that coalitions dissolve as the factors necessary for their formation change (Tarrow 2005:165) . While such analytical speculation may be true, few studies have actually examined the process of coalition dissolution empirically and most of those remain descriptive in nature.
Following Henrich Greve's (1995) analysis of "strategy abandonment" among firms, the dissolution of a social movement coalition can more usefully be viewed as the decision by a sufficient number of coalition partners to abandon their current strategy of cooperation. Thus, coalitions can dissolve as member organizations either abandon their affiliation with the coalition or its common objectives. Such strategy decisions are made in the context of an ever changing and competitive political and resource environment. While such decisions inevitably carry a degree of uncertainty, leaders are well aware that current strategy decisions will over time affect their SMO's future capacity for effective action.
In deciding whether to abandon a strategy and chose a new one, leaders read cues from sources both internal and external to their own organizations (Williams 2004) . Cues external to the SMO come from a range of potential sources including media, government officials, opinion leaders, allies, and counter-movements. Internal cues come from an SMO's board members, staff, leaders, or individual members. Leaders then assess how a given strategy will likely be received by key allies and supporters amidst the uncertainties of a changing political and organizational environment and how that reception will affect their organization's future capacity for effective action. Such strategy decisions affect the extent to which an SMO will be positioned competitively in the changing resource and political environment.
In times of crisis and heightened uncertainty about the future, concern to preserve competitiveness becomes more intense and the potential for decisions to be influenced by social contagion increases (Greve 1995; Massey 2001) . "Contagion is viewed as a form of interorganizational learning that occurs because uncertainty causes decision makers to use social comparison to evaluate the practices of their organization" (Greve 1995:445) . In a crisis atmosphere of uncertainty about the future and a rapidly accelerated time frame for making consequential decisions, SMO leaders may not rely solely on their own assessments of likely outcomes. Rather, they may look to how other SMO leaders are interpreting and responding to a crisis situation and decide to bring their group's strategy into conformity with those of similar or exemplary organizations.
Jennifer Hadden and Sidney Tarrow (2007) explain the aggregate decline of the broader GJM in the years following the 9/11 attacks in terms of a newly repressive political climate and the redirection of movement resources from global justice to other issues. By contrast, our research sheds light on the process by which SMO leaders made a series of consequential decisions that led to the dissolution of the MGJC and arguably altered substantially the trajectory of the GJM in the years to come. The analysis below develops a unique theoretical argument integrating concepts from social movement and organizational theory to better understand how and why leaders of the MGJC made the decisions they did during the crisis immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, before applying our theoretical argument to this case, we must take a step back and discuss more broadly the concepts of resources, exchange relationships, and the central role of managing legitimacy.
Resources and Exchange Relationships
In pursuing their social change goals SMOs use a variety of resources obtained from both internal and external sources. Much analysis in the resource mobilization tradition has examined associations between aggregate patterns of resource availability (e.g., monetary wealth or proportion of college graduates within a community) and the mobilization capacity of social movements. Yet, irrespective of aggregate resource levels, durable patterns of resource inequality shape the differential availability and distribution of resources to particular social groups or collective actors seeking to promote social change. Hence, the typical SMO must simultaneously cultivate, maintain, and preserve numerous internal and external exchange relationships through which it accesses the specific mix of resources supporting its varied endeavors (Edwards and McCarthy 2004) .
Exchange relationships are relations between two entities through which resources of various kinds are made available and accessed.
5 Exchange relationships can be internal or external to an SMO, vary in the value they provide, and are context dependent. Internal exchange relations refer to those that exist within an organizational body, as when an SMO obtains financial resources through contributions or dues paid by members. External exchange relations refer to those outside of the formal organizational structure, as in receiving foundation grants or patron contributions. Exchange relationships also vary in the value of the resources they make accessible to an SMO. Hence, an SMO wanting to start a campaign that influences a broad base of the American public or moderate political elites might seek out as an exchange partner a large national organization with the capacity to provide staff, and thousands of members and dollars, rather than an organization with far fewer resources. In contrast, an organization wishing to engage in a campaign that creates disruption and divides elites may enter into exchange relations with radical groups known for developing innovative tactics. Finally, the value of exchange relationships are context dependent varying by both time and place. For example, valuable relationships with individuals who are elected officials, legislative committee members, or Congressional staffers lose substantial use value when such individuals or their party are voted out of office.
For an SMO, each exchange relationship brings "source constraints" of varying impact. Their impact depends in part upon the specific means of resource access and the type of resource accessed (Edwards and McCarthy 2004) . For example, among the organizations actively involved in planning the GJW examined here, Global Exchange, Essential Action, and the AFL-CIO were all professionalized SMOs, but with different financial exchange relations. The AFL-CIO depended upon contributions from its member unions, which in turn relied upon dues paid by rank-and-file union members. Essential Action depended upon a large grant from another organization, Public Citizen, for most of its operating expenses and had no official members. Global Exchange raised much of its operating funds internally from proceeds it collected for coordinating and leading socially conscious "travel tours" and selling t-shirts, books, and other merchandise. The AFL-CIO has a much larger and broader base of support that is in many ways a substantial advantage. Yet, the actions it can take without alienating considerable parts of its base are constrained by the very diversity of its base. By contrast, Essential Action needs only to preserve its core exchange relationship with Public Citizen. This relationship imposes constraints to be sure, but it is less complicated to manage. Lastly, as a self-sufficient SMO, Global Exchange's core financial exchange relationship was internal and its actions relatively unconstrained.
Legitimacy is a particularly important resource that mediates exchange relationships and facilitates the acquisition of material, human, and other resources (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; Suchman 1995) . Broadly defined, "legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" (Suchman 1995:574) . Legitimacy is objectively possessed by organizations as a resource, but created subjectively by the way current and potential supporters and allies perceive the organization and its actions. Reduced legitimacy in the eyes of supporters or allies can cause strains 5. Previous empirical studies have not explored the role of exchange relationships in coalition mobilization or dissolution. Here we emphasize exchange relationships as a means of providing access to resources. Yet, for that very reason exchange relationships are themselves also a social-organizational resource (Edwards and McCarthy 2004) . Exchange relationships are not reducible to network "ties" in a strictly structural sense because a tie per se only indicates the opportunity for an exchange and does not carry with it the social or cultural meaning of a relationship between entities. in or severance of existing exchange relationships and threatens the organization's ability to remain viable. Consequently, SMOs take great care to consider how key supporters and allies will perceive any new actions or alterations in their public image (Elsbach and Sutton 1992) .
Three Facets of Organizational Legitimacy
Organizational analysts have conceptualized legitimacy as being either strategic or institutional, yet use similar terms to convey different meaning and often talk past each other (Elsbach 1994; Oliver 1991) . Mark Suchman (1995) argues persuasively that the rival strategic and institutional conceptualizations of organizational legitimacy both reflect the perennial, real-world issues organizational leaders must regularly manage. Organizational legitimacy is usefully conceptualized as having three distinct, but complementary facets: pragmatic, moral, and cognitive (Suchman 1995) . The three facets of legitimacy are complementary in part because any single organizational decision to establish an affiliation or undertake an action has moral, pragmatic, or cognitive implications. For example, a decision to engage in a single action like breaking bank windows, burning an American flag, or making classified government documents public may well be seen as morally wrong or right, counterproductive or productive, incomprehensible or comprehensible depending on the observer. Thus, decisions to select particular "tactical play lists" (Edwards and Marullo 1995) from within broader "repertoires of protest" (Tilly 1978 ) entail both potential risks and benefits to all facets of legitimacy contingent upon the specific audience in question.
Perceptions of pragmatic legitimacy stem from assessments of self-interest made primarily by an SMO's most immediate audiences. Several sorts of thinking fit into this category. Constituents will more likely support organizations like labor unions or community organizations if the group's efforts will enhance their well-being through things like improved work or neighborhood conditions. Similarly, opponents of capital punishment or abortion would confer pragmatic legitimacy on SMOs they perceived to mobilize effective opposition, even if their long-term goals remain unattained. Such groups might lose pragmatic legitimacy if they pursued tactics supporters considered counterproductive like the public display of executions, or graphic billboards along highways. The pragmatic concern is not with the morality of specific actions, rather that they would turn away more bystanders than they would attract.
Moral legitimacy rests on assessments of whether an SMO's activities are the acceptable or correct thing to do. One way that moral legitimacy is perceived by actual and potential supporters is when a group engages in legally sanctioned behavior, especially behavior related to monetary resource management and utilization (Edwards and McCarthy 2004) . For example, acquiring nonprofit, tax-exempt status from the Internal Revenue Service conveys a "stamp of approval" to would-be donors that the group is credible and operates within widely held norms regardless of whether or not such assumptions are warranted (McCarthy, Britt, and Wolfson 1991) . Similarly, endorsements from respected groups or individuals signal to observers that the SMO should be granted the same moral legitimacy accorded to the endorser. Tactical choices also carry moral implications. In a presumed pluralist society, illegal tactics are usually viewed by citizens and policy makers as morally illegitimate, and groups who use them put their own moral legitimacy at risk.
Cognitive legitimacy is based on whether the public statements and actions of a group or individual activist are comprehensible (Aldrich and Fiol 1994) . The cultural resonance important to perceptions of cognitive legitimacy is linked to whether an individual or organization can marshal an account or rationale for what they did and make it seem credible to observers (Jepperson 1991) . Groups that communicate in ways that are literally unintelligible to many observers thwart their ability to educate and persuade bystanders, potential and actual supporters, and targets of influence. Independent of moral or pragmatic considerations, many decisions, particularly related to tactics, are utterly incomprehensible to observers who cannot grasp why a group or individual would do such a thing. For example, in 1993 a DC-based ACT-UP activist, Luke Montgomery, legally changed his name to Luke Sissyfag leaving many to ponder why a gay man would intentionally adopt a slur. "It makes no sense. Why he would do that?" and "I just don't get it" were common responses. Those attuned to gay activism understood the name change as a confrontational cultural tactic intended to weaken the power of the very epithets it asserted.
Summary
The case examined here captures how SMO leaders responded to the rapid and substantial changes in the sociopolitical environment caused by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. We will argue that by leading their organizations in ways they expected to be perceived as legitimate in the eyes of key allies and supporters, leaders sought to preserve their SMO's core exchange relationships through the 9/11 crisis. At a minimum, leaders sought to shield their organizations from irreparable harm and position them competitively for the uncertainties of the postcrisis environment. As we will see some leaders also moved quickly to capitalize on the crisis to enhance their organization's influence.
Research Methods and Data
Our research capitalizes on a unique opportunity to observe how organizations within the MGJC responded to the sudden transformation of the political and social climate caused by the horrific events of September 11, 2001 . This analysis relies on a variety of data and builds upon years of participatory and observational research conducted by each author. Data were collected by participating in and observing pre-and post-9/11 MGJC strategy, planning, and decisionmaking meetings; conducting in-depth interviews with protest leaders; and by reviewing documents available on e-mail discussion lists and coalition Web sites set up to help mobilize the protests. The organizations examined here had been identified as those actively planning the GJW protests in research well under way prior to September 2001 (Gillham 2003) . Twenty-five organizations comprised the core of the protest planners with numerous other organizations taking part in working groups to develop the protest infrastructure and plan various actions. Electronic information gathered from MGJC organizations' Web sites and discussion lists during the several months preceding and the three weeks following the September 11 attacks proved crucial in determining the list of groups that had planned to be involved in the protests prior to 9/11 (N = 117) and the composition of the five subcoalitions that joined together in the larger MGJC. These data also helped us identify the groups that withdrew from the protest coalition in the hours and days immediately following the terrorist attacks.
Post-9/11 field research pertinent to this analysis was conducted by the authors in Washington, DC between September 13 and October 1, 2001. Field research included interviews conducted with 12 leaders from key organizations (3 with follow up interviews) as well as observations of 3 different decision-making meetings including the one in which the MGJC was formally disbanded. We also observed informal gatherings at the Anti-Capitalist Convergence welcoming and training center where activists discussed plans to exit the MGJC and continue with protests on their own. Reliance on these varied and insider data sources enhance our confidence in the validity of our findings. The next section describes the MGJC prior to 9/11.
The Mobilization for Global Justice Coalition before September 11
The [IMF] and World Bank will be holding their Joint Annual General Meetings in Washington, DC from September 28 to October 4, 2001. We call on activists . . . to come to Washington during that week to protest and expose the illegitimacy of the institutions and officials who continue to claim the right to determine the course of the world economy . . . It is imperative that supporters of global economic justice send a clear message: the movement for global justice continues to grow . . . (MGJC 2001a). Planning for the GJW began on March 16, 2001 when an umbrella group of alter-global organizations issued a call to action recruiting other organizations to join in planning the events (Essential Action 2001a). They did so by starting with a core of local activists who formed working groups that provided the organizational infrastructure necessary to mobilize the GJW (Gillham and Edwards 2003; Njehu and Ambrose 2001a, 2001b) . Protest planning continued through the spring and summer months as these and other organizations signed onto the call to action and directed resources towards organizing an increasing number of subcoalition events. 6 Participant observations and interviews helped us identify five distinct subcoalitions operating under the broad MGJC umbrella and utilizing the protest infrastructure it had put in place. For simplicity, we refer to them as alter-globalist, advocacy, faith based, anarchist, and anti-imperialist. Each differed in the number of organizations involved, breadth of their public support and ideology, extent to which they would engage in confrontational and sometimes illegal actions, and nature of their typical exchange relationships. Some organizations were involved in more than one subcoalition. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the MGJC and the placement of each organization in the subcoalition that indicates their primary orientation.
7
The alter-global subcoalition members were among the first to mobilize organizations and resources for GJW. They criticized the World Bank and IMF for promoting an exploitive form of globalization that increased poverty and environmental degradation in developing countries. During GJW, groups in this subcoalition intended to engage in both legal and illegal protest activities following the nonviolent protest tradition of Gandhi and the American civil rights movement. Thus, they rejected violence and vandalism as pragmatically ineffectual and morally illegitimate tactics (Benjamin 2000; Danaher 2001 ). Their most ambitious event was to be a September 30 nonviolent direct action meant to lock down the entire downtown core of Washington, DC (Essential Action 2001b).
Most of the alter-globalists had ties to the GJM extending back to the early 1990s when they began pursuing Third World debt cancellation and modifications to IMF structural adjustment programs. Core groups like 50 Years is Enough and Jubilee USA had formed specifically to work on what became known as "global justice" issues. Others had roots in the Latin American solidarity movement of the 1980s (Marullo and Edwards 1997) . Commitments to social justice and human rights made them consistently critical of U.S. foreign policy.
Alter-globalist exchange relationships were characterized by ideological homogeneity and a corresponding narrow base of support. In general, they were moderately sized in membership, and supported professionalized and paid staffs. Several had diversified their resource streams by generating income from alternative sources such as merchandise sales and reality and speaking tours (Gillham 2003) , making themselves less reliant on any one primary exchange partner for the majority of their resources. Because the alter-global organizations were on average relatively young and held critical views of U.S. foreign policy, they lacked strong ties to elected officials and agency personnel. However, the alter-global groups had been meeting regularly with powerful advocacy groups over international development 6. Many of the core activists that first formed the working groups were members of organizations that had been involved in 1999 WTO protests in Seattle and/or 2000 protests against the World Bank and IMF in Washington, DC (Gillham 2003) . Early working group organizers were primarily associated with "alter-global" and "faith-based" organizations as so described in the article. As noted in the original MGJC call to action (Essential Action 2001a), alter-globalists involved from the beginning included 50 Years is Enough, Essential Action, and Global Exchange. Faith-based groups involved in early planning included the Religious Working Group and Maryknoll Office for Global Concern, which together had organized small-scale protests against the World Bank and IMF since the mid-1980s. Most "anti-capitalist," "anti-imperialist," and "advocacy" groups, also described below, joined later in the spring and summer of 2001.
7. Organizational orientation refers to the subcoalition that best fits a group's ideological views and support for actions being planned during the months preceding September 11. The advocacy subcoalition contained some of the nation's most prominent movement organizations with established histories of advocacy on primarily labor and environmental issues, including the AFL-CIO and Greenpeace. Most advocacy organizations had become involved in the GJM somewhat recently through the extension of their core issues into the global justice arena. The advocacy subcoalition had organized several legally sanctioned events to conclude with the "Rally and March for Global Justice" on September 30. The AFL-CIO had promised $100,000 to pay for rental of portable toilets and a large stage for the planned rally and concert as well as to provide volunteer labor to set up the stage. The advocacy subcoalition condemned violence and vandalism and distanced themselves from nonviolent civil disobedience and other illegal tactics.
The structure of advocacy subcoalition exchange relationships differed from the alter-globalists. The typical advocacy organization was large, professionalized, and national in its scope of operations with heterogeneous memberships. They tended to have well-established records of advocacy on issues indirectly related to global justice like environmentalism, women's rights, and labor. Unlike organizations in the other subcoalitions they seldom criticized U.S. foreign and military policy and routinely provided money and labor to Democratic political campaigns. Consequently, most advocacy organizations had established close exchange relationships with elected officials and had strong ties to the Democratic Party. Many relied extensively on foundations, government grants, and membership dues for financial support, making them reliant on relatively more moderate exchange partners and thus particularly constrained in their goals and demands (Edwards and McCarthy 2004; Piven and Cloward 1979) .
The faith-based subcoalition consisted of groups mostly from the Washington metropolitan area. They planned an all-night interfaith worship service starting on September 29 to pray for those harmed by World Bank and IMF policies. They universally rejected the use of violent protest tactics and planned to reduce the prospects of violence on September 30 by acting as self-appointed mediators between direct-action protesters and the police. The exchange relationships typical of the faith-based organizations most closely resembled those of the alter-globalists. Like the alter-global organizations, the faith-based organizations relied on resources from relatively small and ideologically homogeneous memberships. In fact, exchange partners for each subcoalition overlapped since some faith-based organizations had helped start some of the global justice groups. On average, the organizations had small, professionalized and paid staff. Many had long-standing ties to the GJM that predated the 1999 WTO protests (50 Years is Enough 2002 ; Jubilee 2001; Religious Working Group 1997) . Like the alter-globalists, the faith-based groups had been involved in the Latin American solidarity movement and many had protested against the 1991 Gulf War (Swank 1997) . Because they were critical of U.S. foreign policies, most lacked exchange relations with political elites.
The anarchists had the fewest individual members among the five subcoalitions, and planned the most radical events for the GJW. Led by the Anti-Capitalist Convergence (ACC), they consisted mostly of DC-area anarchists who expected like-minded others to arrive in the Capital in time for the protests. The anarchists wanted the World Bank and IMF abolished and planned illegal, confrontational actions aimed at disrupting the meetings, including a nonpermitted "snake march" to the World Bank and IMF headquarters on September 30. Outside the targeted headquarters they planned to use aggressive direct action tactics coinciding with the nonviolent, direct action being planned by alter-globalists. The anarchists would not publicly renounce the use of violence or vandalism (ACC 2001c) .
Key exchange relationships facilitating the anarchists differed substantially from those of the advocacy, alter-global, and faith-based groups. The loosely coupled anarchist networks consisted of numerous local groups and individuals tied into an international infrastructure by "new media" communication channels rather than by formalized SMOs with paid employees. Groups or individuals supported or participated in actions on a case by case basis. Resources for the comparatively modest financial and other needs of anarchist groups came directly from their ideologically radical, homogeneous participants. Moreover, they did not seek exchange partnerships with legislators, government agencies, philanthropic foundations, or political parties. Instead, theirs was an "entirely grassroots effort" operating on a "shoestring budget" in order to critique and resist the institutional arrangements that maintain capitalism (ACC 2001b (ACC , 2001c .
Finally, the anti-imperialist subcoalition consisted primarily of different local and state chapters of the International Action Center (IAC) and their allies. Organizations in this subcoalition had long opposed what they consider to be the "imperialist" foreign policy of the United States. The IAC had been a key organizer of a series of anti-imperialist and "pro-Saddam" protests against the Gulf War in 1991 (Heaney and Rojas 2008) and had recently entered the GJM, criticizing the World Bank and IMF as tools of "U.S. imperialism." This subcoalition organized for GJW a September 29 "anti-Bush" rally outside the White House and a march past the World Bank and IMF headquarters. The rally and the march were to be rhetorically "confrontational" while remaining legal and nonviolent.
Similar to the anarchists, the anti-imperialist subcoalition possessed an ideologically radical and homogeneous view of the global political and economic order. In contrast to the anarchists' decentralized decision-making process, decisions in the anti-imperialist subcoalition were made largely by the IAC, which has a long history of autocratic decision making (Marullo and Edwards 1997) . Also, like the anarchists, the IAC's ideology marginalized it to the radical fringe of American politics, precluding the development of meaningful exchange relations with elected officials, political parties, or government agencies, and causing the IAC and other anti-imperialist groups to rely almost exclusively on their membership for resources.
Participant observations during planning meetings and interviews with movement leaders revealed extensive efforts to mobilize and coordinate the MGJC and GJW events despite strategic and tactical divisions within the coalition and broader GJM. Throughout the spring and summer of 2001, the larger coalition had influenced the actions of participating groups, nudging moderate groups to engage in riskier public affiliations, while moderating the extent of disruption planned by more radical groups at least to the point where the latter agreed not to crash the legally sanctioned events (Gillham and Edwards 2003) . The subcoalitions were unified by a set of demands regarding World Bank and IMF policies.
10 As planning for the GJW continued into September, activists excitedly talked about improved chances that their demands might be met. They cited as evidence recently sponsored legislation favoring debt cancellation and congressional hearings that questioned the World Bank and IMF's disregard for international labor and environmental standards (Njehu and Ambrose 2001a). 11 And then the 9/11 terrorist attacks occurred. Within a matter of hours, all indications of increasing public concern about the ill effects of global trade policy were replaced by public sentiment fixated on rescue, recovery, and retaliation. SMO leaders openly discussed their fears that a miscalculation in their response to the attacks could irreparably damage their respective organizations. The dissolution of the MGJC unfolded quickly as three subcoalitions abandoned their previous strategies of coalition participation and protest coordination within two days of the attacks. The anarchist and anti-imperialist subcoalitions wasted little time deciding to proceed with their plans for confrontational street protests and did so without consulting each other or the MGJC. At their September 13 meeting, the advocacy organizations withdrew from the MGJC and began to distance themselves from any remaining GJW demonstrations, especially those being planned by the anarchists and anti-imperialists (see timeline, Figure 2 ). This sent a strong signal to the representatives of faith-based and alter-global groups in attendance that their groups should do the same. Consequently, by the night of September 15 only alter-global and faith-based organizations turned out for the emergency MGJC planning meeting and reached an agreement to take different paths. The alter-global groups formally dissolved the MGJC and refused to endorse any post-attack events. In contrast, the faith-based groups helped dissolve the broader coalition, but elected to engage in public prayer and vigils for peace.
Anarchist and Anti-Imperialist Organizations Manage Legitimacy by Defecting from the Mobilization for Global Justice Coalition and Intensifying Protests
Though we came together against the Bank and Fund what we came together for is even more important now. We want to continue to mobilize . . . [and] Just hours after the terrorist attacks, the anti-imperialists had already indicated they would engage in public protests independent of the MGJC and the anarchists were openly discussing a similar strategy. Late in the evening of September 11, the IAC posted a video on their Web site making clear to all their intention to continue with planned protests (IAC 2001c). As early as September 12, MGJC activists learned through listservs and other discussions that the anarchists may well do the same (e.g., Infoshop 2001) .
The anarchists easily expanded their critique of the World Bank and IMF to incorporate the assertion that economic and imperialist violence by the United States was linked to the terrorist attacks and the imminent war in Afghanistan, as noted in the ACC's new call to action released just days after the 9/11 attacks.
The U.S. government has failed to recognize the interconnectedness of all the forms of violence. Bombing, encouragement of dictatorships, sweatshops for benefit of U.S. corporations, third world debt, [and] Further, the anarchists highlighted their animosity and resistance toward the government by describing the speed at which the Capital had become overrun by heavily armed military personnel and federal agents while F-16s roared overhead.
In recent days we have seen the militarization of our city, increasingly blatant racist attacks and blind patriotism. Media hysteria and government rhetoric are pushing people to unite through religious bigotry and nationalism. Security, particularly here in Washington, DC, has been heightened as the country prepares to go to war . . . We demand that no more terror or violence be perpetrated in our name . . . There is no justice to be found in retribution, war, racism, corporate globalization or capitalism itself . . . We will not hand over our civil liberties to the greater good of the State (ACC 2001a).
The anarchists took advantage of this militarization and rush to war as a chance to proclaim to the world that the United States of America was little more than a police state at home and a military empire overseas whose policies made the planet a more dangerous place.
To challenge the U.S. government's refusal to acknowledge these connections, anarchists continued with their confrontational plans and symbolically ratcheted up their antipathy toward U.S. policy by adding a previously unplanned flag burning to the beginning of their illegal event (ACC 2001a (ACC , 2004 Noakes, Klocke, and Gillham 2005) . The anarchists showed little concern that their decision to continue with confrontational protest would alienate them completely from the alter-global, advocacy, and faith-based subcoalitions, which it did (ACC 2001d).
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Similar to the ACC, the anti-imperialists announced they too would follow through with their original plans as much as authorities would allow (IAC 2001c) . IAC released three revised calls to action as circumstances changed over the course of the several days following 9/11. Immediately after the attacks heavily armed Capitol and Secret Service police were stationed shoulderto-shoulder around the perimeter of the presidential quarters. How long this security apparatus would remain was unknown and made impossible the originally planned peaceful encirclement of the White House (IAC 2001a (IAC , 2001b (IAC , 2001d . 13 In the first statement, posted using a video on the IAC Web site on the night of 9/11, the IAC explained that they would change their IMF and World Bank protest into one opposing a war in the Middle East and retaliation against American Muslims (IAC 2001c) . Over the next two new calls to action they proposed as an alternative to the encirclement of the White House an "Act Now to Stop War and End Racism" (ANSWER) rally within sight of the White House and then a march down Pennsylvania Avenue towards the Capitol Building. Organized primarily by the IAC with assistance from the Nicaragua Network, activists sought to link what they perceived to be America's racist global-economic policies with the impending war with Afghanistan (IAC 2001b (IAC , 2001c (IAC , 2001d .
Anarchist and Anti-Imperialist Organizations Manage Legitimacy.
The decisions by the anarchists and the anti-imperialists to defect from the MGJC and continue with contentious protests were consistent with an effort to maintain or even enhance all three facets of legitimacy in the eyes of key constituencies. Since the 1999 Battle in Seattle, anarchism had re-emerged as a visible, radical tributary of the U.S. global justice movement. The anarchist leaders attributed the recent growth of their movement to its visible participation in confrontational actions that succeeded in shutting down the WTO meetings in Seattle. By the time of the 9/11 attacks, the anarchists were already chaffing at the MGJC's efforts to moderate both their tactics and message. 14 The anarchist's intent to shed coalition constraints and forge ahead with confrontational street protests became apparent prior to their public announcements like those quoted above. 15 Similarly, the IAC video released on the evening of 9/11 made clear that the antiimperialists would also continue with controversial public protests.
For anarchists and anti-imperialist leaders, continued involvement in the MGJC with the expectation to moderate their plans risked compromising their ability to attract and retain new members and threatened their capacity to expand further in the post-attack context. The attacks placed the ACC and other anarchists groups at a cross roads forcing a choice that they made rather quickly and easily. 16 The decision was made easily because they were confident that moderation would undermine their source of recent growth. Failing to capitalize on such an opportunity to enhance recruitment by not marshaling a sufficiently radical response would have compromised their pragmatic legitimacy among exchange partners including long-time anarchists and newly recruited ones.
Our analysis indicates that the anti-imperialists were just as concerned about pragmatic legitimacy as the anarchists. Interest in enhancing pragmatic legitimacy in the eyes of key exchange partners influenced their decision to engage in anti-war protests. The IAC's recent involvement in the MGJC had offered a practical way to regain some of the organizational prominence it had lost during Gulf War protests in the early 1990s when its autocratic decision making and extreme "pro-Saddam" views marginalized it from the broader anti-war movement (Heaney and Rojas 2008; Marullo and Edwards 1997; Swank 1997) . The September 11 attacks presented the IAC with a compelling opportunity. The imminent war with Afghanistan, along with the fact that the IAC was already fully mobilized for the GJW in Washington, situated them competitively to take the lead in any re-emergence of the antiwar movement. Indeed, by the evening of September 15 the IAC had reframed their planned protest around anti-war and anti-racism themes, renamed their rally to "Act Now to Stop War and End Racism," and had already begun to organize an anti-war coalition called ANSWER. Had they not acted in this way, their main constituencies may have begun to question the effectiveness of their leadership for not capitalizing on such an opportunity resulting in a loss of pragmatic legitimacy.
Managing perceptions of their moral legitimacy was salient for anarchists and antiimperialists alike. The ACC and IAC contended that the terrorist attacks were a logical response to U.S. influence in the world. Inaction by the anarchists was unimaginable when the state was so blatantly misusing its power by mobilizing for war abroad and militarizing the streets of the Capital. The same was true for anti-imperialists had they abandoned their protests. Resource partners would have seen them as acquiescing to power and immorally condoning war with Afghanistan by not "speaking truth to power" (ACC 2004; IAC 2001c) . For both subcoalitions backing away or moderating actions at this time carried the grave risk of being perceived as morally ambivalent by core supporters who could easily shift resources to more radical groups.
Finally, continuing to protest independent of the MGJC helped maintain or even increase the anarchist's and anti-imperialist's cognitive legitimacy among key constituencies.
14. Sources include a confidential interview with ACC Protest Leader #1, conducted by Patrick Gillham, September 17, 2001 , Capital City Brewing Company, Washington, DC. This respondent was a full-time volunteer for a small nonprofit organization in Washington, DC. S/he was closely involved with the anarchist subcoalition but had strong ties with leaders in two core alter-global groups. The respondent served as a broker (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Obach 2004 ) between anarchist, alter-global, and advocacy groups and routinely attended meetings held by groups within each subcoalition. Discussions and decisions made during these meetings were then quickly disseminated by the respondent to SMOs across the subcoalitions. Anarchists had long deplored the domination of the state while the anti-imperialists had condemned the extension of U.S. military power to all parts of the globe. Aggressively challenging the imminent war fit seamlessly into both subcoalitions' antipathy for U.S. foreign and military policy and matched key exchange partners expectations about how to best respond in the post-attack context. Refraining from doing so now by refusing to protest altogether or by engaging in significantly less confrontational actions would run counter to their issues, goals, and raison d'être (ACC 2001a), and would be utterly incomprehensible to each subcoalitions' radical and uncompromising base. 17 The decisions by the two radical subcoalitions to continue with confrontational street protests reverberated through the rest of the MGJC.
Advocacy Organizations Manage Legitimacy by Defecting from the Mobilization for Global Justice Coalition and Abandoning Protest
Today I have sent a letter to . . . [the] president of the World Bank, and . . . [the] managing director of the International Monetary Fund, calling upon them to cancel . . . the[ir] annual meeting . . . As I said to them in my letter . . . this is a time for pause and profound reflection . . . For our part, the AFL-CIO will not . . . continue our planning to lead a peaceful mass protest . . . nor will we participate in any such demonstrations. At the current time, our energies and attention are fully focused on the massive relief effort in which our unions are involved, and on bringing people together to begin the process of healing and renewing our sense of community and confidence . . . (Sweeney 2001b ).
The entire advocacy subcoalition withdrew from the MGJC almost immediately and actively distanced themselves from all protest events that might still be held, especially those led by the ACC and IAC. The immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks put all protest groups in a crisis situation, but perhaps none more so than the AFL-CIO, which had 634 members killed in the high-jacked airplanes and Twin Towers (AFL-CIO 2002). They were the first advocacy organization to publicly announce withdrawal from the MGJC and GJW events and did so just days after the attacks. According to Mike Cavanaugh, deputy director in the AFL-CIO's Department of Field Mobilization, the decision to withdraw was floated during an emergency meeting with national staff on Wednesday, September 12, shortly before AFL-CIO President Sweeney released a press statement expressing support for U.S. political leaders and "the appropriate American response" during this time of crises (Sweeney 2001a). 18 In the afternoon of September 13, during a previously scheduled meeting to coordinate protest plans among groups in the advocacy subcoalition and select alter-globalists, the AFL-CIO told those present that they were withdrawing from the MGJC and would redirect all material and human resources to disaster relief among New York union members and their families. At the time, unionists were already at ground zero trying to find victims of the attacks amidst the rubble, including those AFL-CIO members employed in the Twin Towers (AFL-CIO 2001b). The AFL-CIO was not alone in deciding quickly to exit the MGJC as representatives of other advocacy organizations announced their withdrawal from the broader coalition later in the meeting. 19 At the suggestion of a few alter-global SMO leaders present at the gathering, the advocacy groups agreed to postpone publicizing their decisions until the group's next meeting, already scheduled for Monday, September 17. The four day delay was intended to give organizations in the advocacy and other subcoalitions time to finalize decisions about continued MGJC involvement, write press releases, and consider longer term goals and working relationships in the new political context (Advocacy Coalition 2001).
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Despite the intention to delay their public announcement, the AFL-CIO, Sierra Club, and several other advocacy groups succumbed to pressure for quick and decisive action and broke the agreement by publicly withdrawing from the MGJC the next day on Friday, September 14 (Associated Press 2001; Sweeney 2001b). As a result, most of the other advocacy groups scrambled to write press statements, which they released by early Monday morning, September 17. The statements reflected concerns about legitimacy by expressing shock over the attacks, sympathy for those directly affected, and unequivocal withdrawal from the MGJC before the World Bank and IMF publicly canceled their meetings (Associated Press 2001). Other advocacy groups, like Feminist Majority and Health Gap Coalition, withdrew from the MGJC without any public comment, communicating their decision to their former coalition partners by simply failing to attend the advocacy organization meeting on September 17. Some advocacy groups like International Rivers withdrew and then further distanced themselves from the MGJC by expunging from their Web site any history of their involvement in the MGJC just weeks after the attacks.
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On Monday afternoon, September 17, advocacy and key alter-globalist leaders met to discuss whether they should continue to work together on global justice issues in the months to come and to further reflect on the decisions they had made to withdraw from or disband the MGJC. At the meeting we observed leaders as they struggled to find a way to keep global justice issues on the table in the post-9/11 sociopolitical context without damaging their organizations. All the groups present at the meeting expressed a sense of incredulousness when a liaison from the anarchists confirmed reports circulating since the attacks that the anarchists were moving forward with confrontational protests independent of the MGJC. 22 Later in the meeting a union leader wondered aloud "how can we put forward a critique [of the World Bank and IMF, as well as U.S. intentions to go to war against Afghanistan] without getting lumped into terrorism?" 23 The nation's newly elevated security priorities were of particular concern to the leaders present. Continuing to push a global justice agenda when many members, political allies, and the general public appeared consumed with preventing further terrorist attacks lacked cognitive and pragmatic legitimacy to many in the meeting. According to the leader of a group working with unions and student activists, such efforts felt "too aggressive right now" and far too risky to appear to be "challeng[ing] the Bush [Administration] at a time like this."
24 All of the discussions that occurred among advocacy groups and select alter-globalists, and the actions taken by advocacy organizations, indicate a concern for preserving legitimacy in the eyes of key exchange partners.
Advocacy Organizations Manage Legitimacy. The advocacy groups faced a difficult choice. Hold to their agreement with other MGJC groups but risk straining key exchange relations, or strain relations with the remaining MGJC groups by publicly abandoning the coalition and denouncing the radicals without further delay. The words and actions of the defecting groups indicate that they perceived that staying in the MGJC would damage their most important exchange relations. AFL-CIO leaders in particular indicated an expectation of a catastrophic loss of pragmatic legitimacy had they continued their involvement with the MGJC and GJW.
Their statements made during interviews, meetings, and in press releases evidenced the fear they felt that members nationwide, but especially in New York, would see a choice to protest instead of mobilizing support for fallen members and their families as flagrantly unresponsive to member needs and a dereliction of their duty to the union. Cavanaugh (2001) indicated that the decision to redirect resources to aid their members was a "no brainer," and that to continue with the MGJC was for the AFL-CIO "just not appropriate at this time."
25 Another advocacy organization leader expressed concern for pragmatic legitimacy by declaring that continuing with protests would only marginalize global justice activists more than they already were.
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Advocacy groups also expressed concerns consistent with a potentially substantial loss of moral legitimacy. In the emotionally charged and volatile context in the week following 9/11, they expressed fear that many of their members and political allies would likely have viewed public demonstrations in one of the attacked cities as morally indefensible. Many advocacy subcoalition activists indicated that any affiliation with public protests would be considered unpatriotic and disgraceful by a range of exchange partners including long-term members, supporters, and political allies. In response to the suggestion by some activists that the attacks provided an opportunity to advance the GJM and that some of the planned actions should continue, an AFL-CIO organizer denounced its moral illegitimacy in the strongest possible terms characterizing the suggestion as "sick" opportunism and "at some level not human." 27 SMOs lose cognitive legitimacy when members, supporters, or allies find their actions or message to be incomprehensible or inexplicable in light of the group's previous record. Such concerns were notably evident in the September 17 advocacy group meeting as leaders feared that key exchange partners would not be able to understand why, had they had continued to protest after the attacks. These organizations had well-established records on labor, environmental, women's, and minority rights issues. For many, their active participation in the MGJC had brought with it new public affiliations and a calculated effort to extend their long-standing issue frames into the emerging global justice arena. Participation in the MGJC provided a way to draw their members more directly into globalization issues. That strategy may well have worked had the attacks not happened. Yet, as noted in the September 17 advocacy meeting, leaders seemed convinced that continued participation in the MGJC and GJW would have raised doubts and confusion among supporters and lead to a crescendo of questions from members like "What do anti-American protests have to do with protecting the environment, opposing sexism, or creating better working conditions?" Advocacy group leaders were acutely aware of this problem and that the long-term strategy of connecting members to global justice issues needed to be suspended in the post-attack context. Advocacy leaders seemed equally certain that continued participation in the MGJC and GJW protests would have been incomprehensible to external exchange partners, especially in Washington. Most advocacy organizations had worked for decades to build strong and productive relationships within the broad policy advocacy networks in the Capital including elected officials, agency staff, and the Democratic Party. They had no intention of putting these relationships at risk by attempting to push forward global justice issues or by being associated with radical protests in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks. [T]he terror attacks on September 11, radically changed American perceptions of the world. As a result, the nature of the events in Washington has changed. While the planned Inter-religious Service will still happen . . . it will be different . . . The Religious Working Group unanimously decided to go ahead with a service . . . A number of members pointed out that the religious community has a calling to speak on these issues even when others cannot, and if it does so may call forth a level of public attention and concern that is crucial in moments of crisis (Waskow 2001) .
Alter-Global and Faith-Based Organizations Manage Legitimacy by Disbanding the Mobilization for Global Justice Coalition
We cancelled the demonstration and the [civil disobedience] because the moment was absolutely wrong. Any press attention would have been negative. We would not be able to achieve any of our objectives if we pressed on . . . We . . . saw the interfaith service as a good way to express ourselves, our community, our commitment given the extremely unpleasant moment in the whole U.S (Steven Bennett, Executive Director of Witness for Peace).
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On Saturday evening, September 15, a hastily organized emergency MGJC meeting was held at Saint Aloysius Catholic Church. The time and location of the meeting had been widely circulated via the MGJC organizing list-serve. Of the approximately 150 people that attended the gathering, most represented alter-global groups and a few were from faith-based groups. Spokespersons from the advocacy, anarchist, and anti-imperialist subcoalitions were conspicuously absent. The mood was somber and activists openly discussed their reservations about continuing with the mobilization given the gravity of recent events.
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The main agenda item was whether the mobilization should continue as planned. Answering that question was complicated by the alter-globalists' commitment to participatory decision making. Many present hesitated to proceed with the mobilization without securing approval from their geographically dispersed constituents who had endorsed the MGJC and donated money to support it. The pace of post-attack events and the urgency of the situation demanded fast action. Activists present agreed that contacting every supporter in time to follow through with the mobilization would be impossible. Moreover, most were certain that at least some, if not many, distant supporters would oppose continuing with the contentious actions during a time of national crisis.
Palpable frustration about the changed political circumstances fused with anger at the ACC and IAC percolated through all discussions at the emotionally charged emergency meeting. Uncertainty about how to proceed and concern for the fate of the GJM and their own organizations were expressed openly throughout the meeting as activists discussed the lack of good options available for the MGJC. Anxiety over how any continuation of MGJC protests would be perceived by key exchange partners and the general public dominated the emotional landscape of the meeting. Even though the radical groups had made their defection from the MGJC clear to all within the coalition, many activists present at the meeting believed strongly that fact would be lost on the press, the public, and perhaps even many of their own members. Most indicated that if the coalition stayed together, there would be no way for groups involved to avoid damaging associations in the public eye with any confrontational actions carried out by the ACC and IAC.
Such concerns were not limited solely to potential ACC and IAC actions. Many present worried aloud that most, if not all, of the original MGJC plans were now too confrontational and potentially offensive regardless of the activities carried out by the radical groups. During the meeting, an alter-global activist argued persuasively that continuing with MGJC sponsored street protests and a concert on the National Mall featuring the controversial band Rage Against the Machine while smoke was still billowing from the Pentagon would be "like dancing on graves." 30 In an interview the day after the meeting, a leader of Jubilee USA, a core alter-global group in the MGJC, expressed similar legitimacy related sentiments about the consequences of not withdrawing from street protests: [W] e had gone into the [September 13] meeting with the AFL-CIO and the partners feeling like we . . . didn't want the terrorism to stop us from holding the events that we had already planned . . . But it became clear within 24 hours of talking with people . . . [and] at the meeting . . . [that] it was very important . . . that we . . . call off the street demonstration [because] it was not going to be an appropriate time in this country for people to hear . . . our message and it might cause a serious backlash against the people that we were ultimately trying to reach out to . . .
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During the meeting some activists asked whether they could keep the coalition alive by bundling together global justice issues with a potential forthcoming war. Opponents of this idea responded that, while they personally possessed anti-war sympathies, they worried that trying to link global justice issues to anti-war issues would only cloud the topic. The same Jubilee USA leader quoted above explained her concern that including the topics of war and peace might be confusing and ultimately distract from the primary work she saw ahead for her organization to "convince our constituency and our government officials that [debt cancellation] is not done and [that] we need to keep moving on this." She confided that "now it's really hard to know exactly how [to do this] . . . Will we have . . . the ear of Congress, [or] the ear of [the] American public on issues of debt?" Clearly she believed that trying to integrate war issues and global justice was difficult if not impossible in the given circumstances and would needlessly complicate efforts to get the IMF, World Bank, and developed nations to cancel third world debt.
After several hours of deliberation, those present at the MGJC emergency meeting reached a nearly unanimous agreement to disband the MGJC and by default, to cancel all public events that might be associated with the MGJC name. Some alter-globalists agreed to participate in low profile workshops at the end of the month to discuss amongst themselves how they might proceed in a post-9/11 climate. At the same emergency meeting, the faithbased organizers indicated they would continue with their prayer service, but without any use of the MGJC name. The prayer service would provide an opportunity for the faith community to speak out against war and promote reconciliation.
Alter-Global and Faith-Based Organizations Manage Legitimacy. Pragmatic legitimacy concerns influenced organizations from both subcoalitions to disband the broader coalition. During the emergency MGJC meeting activists made clear that they believed continuing with protests under the MGJC banner risked damaging their organizations and the future of the GJM. Disbanding the coalition seemed to be the best decision because doing so minimized possible damage to key exchange relationships and related resource streams. It would be necessary to access these same exchange relations if activists hoped to remobilize the movement after the crises passed. Doing anything that undermined these relations would be a tactical error. In addition, alter-globalists seemed particularly concerned about maintaining their newly acquired working relationships with powerful allies in the advocacy subcoalition whose increased participation in the GJM contributed substantially to the movement's political clout and access to material, human, and other resources.
32 Their decisions to disband the MGJC and cancel public protests provided a practical way to maintain good relations with the advocacy groups and leave the door open for future collaborations when the political atmosphere was again more receptive to global justice issues.
The faith-based groups were in a similar position. Many had helped found core alterglobal organizations. Disbanding the MGJC reduced the risk that confrontational protests might stain the name of the coalition, themselves, or alter-global groups they had started years earlier. Discussions among activists indicate that the decision to disband was made in part for the pragmatic purpose of protecting the substantial resources invested in starting and maintaining the core alter-global organizations over the last several years. They expressed confidence that few supporters of the interfaith groups would fault them for trying to minimize potential damage to the alter-global groups and the MGJC name and worried instead, that supporters might criticize a strategy that risked damaging public affiliations with radical groups and controversial protest activities.
The remaining alter-global groups also acted out of concern for maintaining moral legitimacy. Had they not disbanded the MGJC, they risked seeing the names of both the MGJC and their own groups discredited by association with anarchists and anti-imperialist protests, which they said many of their group's key and potential supporters would consider offensive. Throughout the entire MGJC planning process, many of the alter-global groups had taken great care to differentiate themselves from the more radical groups. However, such distinctions no matter how carefully crafted and meticulously cultivated prior to 9/11 would be completely lost on the press, political allies, the public, and, perhaps most importantly, on their own members in the charged post-9/11 political context.
Faith-based organizations struggled between maintaining the MGJC in order to keep the broader movement alive and redirecting their efforts towards opposing the forthcoming war. Concerns for managing moral legitimacy influenced their decision to dissolve the MGJC in order to focus their attention on public vigils for peace and reconciliation. "Bearing witness" during uncertain and morally ambiguous times would protect their moral authority. Indeed, faith-based activists openly expressed their individual concerns that refraining from actively organizing vigils for peace would amount to an abandonment of hope and call into question the essence of their own faith-based political engagement. They indicated that failing to speak out publically against a retaliatory war that would only increase human suffering and fuel further injustice would have compromised the moral legitimacy of their organizations in the eyes of peace-minded religious constituents.
Efforts at managing cognitive legitimacy were also evident among most alter-global and faith-based groups. During the final meeting of the MGJC, various alter-global groups said that disbanding the coalition would be better than trying to integrate an anti-war message into the global justice message and going forward. Some alter-global and faith-based leaders articulated the expectation that trying to link global justice issues to antiwar issues would confuse the topic and bury their core concern for debt cancelation within "a landscape of . . . issues."
33 By contrast, other alter-global and faith-based groups with roots in the solidarity and peace movements of the 1980s saw not disbanding the MGJC as the potential source of an opposite confusion among constituents and the broader public. Only by dissolving the coalition would they be able to speak out against the forthcoming war with sufficient clarity. Thus, disbanding the MGJC removed a potentially distracting global justice frame, enabling them to rekindle their long-standing peace and justice frames in the post-attack environment. 
Conclusion
This research has drawn upon social movement and organizational theory to develop a unique theoretical argument to explain how organizations involved in a coalition planning protests against the World Bank and IMF responded to the sudden transformation of the sociopolitical and organizational environment caused by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 . Previous research and theorizing indicate that coalitions dissolve when factors relevant to coalition formation change. In contrast, our research indicates that independent of coalition formation, the organizational decision-making process of legitimacy management profoundly shapes coalition dissolution, leading us to draw the following conclusions.
First, managing legitimacy to preserve exchange relationships influenced all decisions. The deliberations and decision of MGJC leaders, though indirectly articulated at times, were consistent with our argument that they would make decisions they expected to preserve their group's capacity for post-crisis action by managing its legitimacy in the eyes of key exchange partners. Getting through the uncertainty of the post-attack crisis without doing irreparable harm to their organizations appeared to be of paramount and most immediate concern to the SMO leaders. Yet, decision makers did not discuss the future impact of their actions in economistic terms or make formalized cost-benefit projections. Rather, they framed discussions and acted in ways that reflected efforts to maintain exchange relationships through the intermediary process of assessing how potential actions might affect their SMO's legitimacy in the eyes of their most significant exchange relations. Guided by those assessments leaders acted in ways they expected to preserve organizational legitimacy and hoped would sustain core exchange relationships through the uncertainty of the post-attack crisis and insulate their groups, and in some cases the broader movement, from long-term harm. Undoubtedly, other factors also influenced post-attack decisions by SMO leaders, yet their discussions, decisions, and actions were consistent with the process illustrated here. The capacity of this single analytical tool to help explain the full range of SMO actions attests to its usefulness in anticipating and understanding organizational decision making in other settings.
Second, the decision process described here did not occur in isolation with leaders making their own assessments independent of other groups in the MGJC. Rather, they paid close attention to how their counterparts-especially those within their same subcoalition or in other subcoalitions with which they wished to maintain newly developed and high-value exchange relations-were interpreting the situation and positioning their own organizations. In the uncertainty of the post-attack crisis, most protest organizations seemed to follow the lead of similar organizations within their subcoalitions, in some cases resembling contagion. For some in the MGJC, deciding how best to manage their organization's legitimacy and preserve its key exchange relations seemed to come down to a decision about which SMOs they wanted to be associated in the post-attack environment.
Third, after the attacks, the strategic ties connecting organizations to the broader coalition unraveled one subcoalition at a time as organizations retreated to their homophilous subcoalitions, leaving those most vested in the GJM to finally dissolve the coalition. With the exception of the alter-globalists, the majority of protest organizations appeared to have had stronger ties to organizations within their subcoalitions than to the MGJC or the broader GJM. JoAnn Carmin and Elizabeth Bast's (2009) argument that the formation of coalitions within the GJM were facilitated by cognitive homophily appears to apply to the dissolution of the MGJC as well. Other SMOs separated from the MGJC and went their own way, engaging in new actions that would make them more competitive in the altered environment, as was the case with anti-imperialist organizations who by September 13 had already positioned themselves to lead any emergent anti-war movement.
Our analysis suggests several lines of subsequent theorizing and additional research related to organizational legitimacy and exchange relationships, and the effects of 9/11 on the broader GJM. In what ways does the model of organizational decision making observed in the post-attack crisis apply to how SMOs make strategy decisions in more typical circumstances or in other movements? Are some facets of legitimacy perceived to be more important for the preservation of exchange relationships than others? Did the management of legitimacy examined here achieve its intended purpose to preserve exchange relations and maintain the capacity for social action or did many groups lose important exchange relations and related resources and falter in the aftermath of the 9/11? Finally, what happened to the broader U.S. branch of the GJM as the political context continued to change over the next several years? Did the core of the movement go into abeyance where it remains today (Taylor 1989) , change direction by mobilizing Social Forums (Smith 2004 (Smith , 2008 , "spillout" into the reemergent anti-war movement (Hadden and Tarrow 2007; Woehrle, Coy, and Maney 2008) , or engage in some combination of these or other possibilities?
